Written by Joe Tommasino, Esq.
Supreme Court of Nevada
Child custody: (1) The Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction Enforcement Act (UCCJEA) governs jurisdiction over child-custody proceedings and aims to avoid simultaneous proceedings in different courts; and (2) this opinion clarifies the effect foreign-custody proceedings have on a court’s determination of its UCCJEA jurisdiction. Here, the father of a minor child filed for divorce in Nevada and requested child custody and child support. The district court denied these requests, determining it lacked jurisdiction and noting that a custody action brought in Canada by the mother of the child was ongoing. Although the child was in Canada for a time preceding commencement of the mother’s custody action, the record shows that for jurisdictional purposes, this was a temporary absence from Nevada. Thus, the child is considered to have resided in Nevada for the requisite period to establish home-state jurisdiction in Nevada under the UCCJEA. The Court therefore reversed the district court’s order denying the father’s request for child custody and support to the extent it failed to recognize that it has jurisdiction. Nonetheless, the father previously brought a separate proceeding in Canada that resulted in a Hague determination that the child was not returnable to Nevada because Canada is the child’s habitual residence, and consequently, it may be appropriate for Nevada to ultimately decline to exercise jurisdiction. Such a determination is premature because the Canadian court where the mother’s custody action is pending has not yet determined whether it has jurisdiction and the district court has not yet attempted to communicate with the Canadian court. It would be imprudent to determine that the Canadian court is a more appropriate forum without providing the parties an opportunity to properly brief the issue in the district court. Gill v. Gill (Child Custody, 142 Nev. Adv. Op. No. 19, ___ P.3d ___ (March 5, 2026).
Estates: NRS 134.070, which prescribes distribution of the decedent’s estate to “the next of kin in equal degree,” requires a per capita without representation distribution scheme, to the exclusion of more remote relatives. “Per capita” means “by the head or individual” and refers to taking equally with other children or heirs. If a statute requires a distribution system of per capita without representation, it refers to a relative’s taking, if at all, “in his or her own right, and not as a representative of a deceased ancestor.” Conversely, to take “per stirpes,” or “by root or stocks,” means to take by representation “the share that a deceased ancestor would have taken had he or she survived the intestate.” While NRS 134.070 does not mention the terms “per capita without representation” or “per stirpes,” the Supreme Court of Nevada concluded that NRS 134.070 requires a per capita without representation distribution. The Court noted that the Nevada Legislature, despite having many opportunities to clarify that NRS 134.070 requires a per stirpes distribution, has never done so. <em>In re: Estate of Ulvang (Civil) , 142 Nev. Adv. Op. No. 22, ___ P.3d ___ (March 12, 2026).
Gaming: In resolving gaming disputes, the terms of a gaming wager are construed according to an establishment’s house rules, so long as patrons have sufficient notice of those rules. Here, appellant Steve Friedlander disputed payout terms of two wagers he placed at a William Hill non-pari-mutuel sports book. Specifically, William Hill’s 150-to-1 and 500-to-1 respective limited odds reduced the total payout on the wagers from $609,492 to $35,140. Despite William Hill’s house rules explicitly limiting odds on the wagers he placed, Friedlander maintained that he was entitled to full track odds payout. The Nevada Gaming Control Board determined that William Hill was justified in denying this payout because the signage at the sports book was sufficient to provide notice of the limited odds, and those limited odds controlled. The Board’s determination was supported by evidence and was not arbitrary, capricious, or otherwise contrary to law. Friedlander v. Tamarack Junction Race & Sports Book (Civil), 142 Nev. Adv. Op. No. 23, ___ P.3d ___ (March 12, 2026).
Jurors: Merely identifying minority venire members struck by the State in a criminal case does not meet the burden of showing an inference of discriminatory purpose. In Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79 (1986), the United States Supreme Court held that the Equal Protection Clause prohibits a party from using peremptory challenges to strike potential jurors solely on account of race. When a defendant objects that a peremptory challenge is race-based, Batson’s three-step framework applies.
(1) Defense counsel must make a prima facie showing that the State exercised the peremptory challenge(s) based on race.
(2) If that showing is made, the State may present a race-neutral explanation for the challenged strike(s).
(3) The district court must determine whether the defense has shown purposeful discrimination.
The district court is not required to proceed to the second and third steps unless the opponent of the strike(s) satisfies the first step. At step one, the party raising the Batson challenge must show “that the totality of the relevant facts gives rise to an inference of discriminatory purpose.” This standard is not onerous and does not require the opponent of the strike(s) to meet his or her ultimate burden of proof under Batson. But “the mere fact that the State used a peremptory challenge to exclude a member of a cognizable group is not, standing alone, sufficient to establish a prima facie case under Batson’s first step; ‘something more’ is required.” Although a pattern of strikes against African American jurors included in the particular venire might give rise to an inference of discrimination, a pattern is not the only way to satisfy step one. In addition to a pattern of strikes against members of a targeted group, “circumstances that might support an inference of discrimination include, but are not limited to, the disproportionate effect of peremptory strikes, the nature of the proponent’s questions and statements during voir dire, disparate treatment of members of the targeted group, and whether the case itself is sensitive to bias.” Here, in district court, the defendant based his Batson challenge on the State’s use of five of its eight peremptory strikes against venire members who identified as members of any racial or ethnic minority, not members of a single minority. The Supreme Court of Nevada held that “the district court did not clearly err when it denied [the] Batson challenge at step one”; “[m]erely identifying minority venire members struck by the State does not meet the burden of showing an inference of discriminatory purpose.” This is because “the raw number of peremptory challenges used against targeted-group members is meaningless without some point of reference.” The ratio between the number of strikes the State made against targeted-group members and the total number of peremptory strikes it made provides one point of reference, but “[t]hat point of reference has little meaning . . . without additional information such as the number of targeted-group members remaining in the venire after the for-cause challenges.” Separately, the Court indicated that a substitute expert’s testimony will be inadmissible if the expert is merely a conduit for another analyst’s testimonial statements, or if the expert both relies on and conveys the absent analyst’s testimonial statements in support of their opinion. But if the record shows the expert’s opinion is meaningfully independent and not based on testimonial hearsay, it will not violate the Confrontation Clause even where the expert may have reviewed another expert’s report in preparation for trial. Next, the Court emphasized that voluntary intoxication does not excuse criminal conduct; it may negate the specific intent required for first-degree murder, however, thereby reducing the degree of the crime. Finally, other courts addressing transcripts as a listening aid have allowed their use where the transcript helps jurors follow the audio tape and precautions are taken. Thus, the district court did not abuse its discretion by allowing the jury to view a transcript while listening to a 911 call. Matadamas-Serrano (Ruben) v. State, 142 Nev. Adv. Op. No. 20, ___ P.3d ___ (March 5, 2026).
<strong>Public records: (1) State agencies must promptly release public documents requested under the Nevada Public Records Act (NPRA), NRS Chapter 239; but (2) information contained in a peace officer’s investigative file is exempt from the NPRA’s general disclosure requirement to the extent the information is confidential under NRS 289.080. </strong> Because NRS 289.080 prevents the officer under investigation from accessing the investigative file unless the investigating agency recommends punitive action, information within the investigative file is exempt from disclosure under the NPRA. <em>Am. Civil Liberties Union of Nev. v. Clark Cnty. School Dist. </em>, 142 Nev. Adv. Op. No. 24, ___ P.3d ___ (March 26, 2026).
Religion: (1) The ecclesiastical-abstention doctrine requires civil courts to abstain from resolving matters on the basis of religious doctrine and practice; and (2) as an exception to the ecclesiastical-abstention doctrine, the neutral-principles exception permits civil courts to adjudicate disputes involving religious organizations so long as the issues are determinable using neutral principles of law and without resort to religious doctrines, practices, or texts. Although religious associations should be afforded certain prerogatives of sovereignty, the State of Nevada has an interest in affording disputants some judicial recourse for resolving their arguments. Here, the Supreme Court of Nevada clarified that the neutral-principles exception to the ecclesiastical-abstention doctrine may apply beyond real property disputes among church members. When neutral principles of law can resolve the underlying dispute, without consideration of ecclesiastical or doctrinal matters, then the ecclesiastical-abstention doctrine does not apply. Singh v. Dist. Ct. (Singh) (Civil), 142 Nev. Adv. Op. No. 25, ___ P.3d ___ (April 2, 2026).
Short trials: (1) Nevada Short Trial Rules (NSTR) 3(d) requires district courts to adjudicate objections to proposed judgments, and reason and public policy support the conclusion that NSTR 3(d) likewise requires district courts to adjudicate NRCP 59 motions; and (2) the short trial judge here exceeded her delegated authority by adjudicating an objection and NRCP 59 motion Under the NSTR, short trial judges “have all the powers and authority of a district court judge except with respect to the final judgment.” Short trial judges are to prepare proposed judgments for the district court to review and either approve or reject. Proposed judgments that are approved by the district court become the final judgment of the matter. This appeal examined whether the district court judge or the short trial judge is to adjudicate any objections to proposed judgments and subsequent NRCP 59 motions to alter or amend the judgment or for a new trial. The plain language of NSTR 3(d) requires that objections must be adjudicated by the district court. Reason and public policy led the Court to similarly conclude that the district court must adjudicate NRCP 59 motions. The short trial judge here exceeded her authority by adjudicating an objection to the entry of judgment and a post-judgment motion to alter or amend, or for a new trial, under NRCP 59. Public policy supports having the district court adjudicate NRCP 59 motions. The short trial judge’s ability to amend or add to the final judgment would undermine the role of the district court and could, as shown here, diminish the significance of the district court’s required approval of the judgment. While the Short Trial Program’s purpose “is to expedite civil trials,” the program stresses the importance of the district court’s review, and the district court’s adjudication of NRCP 59 motions protects the finality of the judgment. Vegas Aqua, LLC v. Jupitor Corp. (Civil), 142 Nev. Adv. Op. No. 21, ___ P.3d ___ (March 5, 2026).
Resources
- “Advance Opinions” are viewable at this link: http://nvcourts.gov/Supreme/Decisions/Advance_Opinions/
- A list of “Forthcoming Opinions” is available at this link every Wednesday: http://nvcourts.gov/Supreme/Decisions/Forthcoming_Opinions/
- “Supreme Court Unpublished Orders” are viewable at this link: http://nvcourts.gov/Supreme/Decisions/Unpublished_Orders/
- “Court of Appeals Unpublished Orders” are viewable at this link: http://nvcourts.gov/Supreme/Decisions/Court_of_Appeals/Unpublished_Orders/
About the author
Joe Tommasino has served as Staff Attorney for the Las Vegas Justice Court since 1996. Joe is the President of the Nevada Association for Court Career Advancement (NACCA).
About the article
© 2026 Clark County Bar Association (CCBA). All rights reserved. No reproduction of any portion of this issue is allowed without written permission from the publisher. Editorial policy available upon request.
This article was originally submitted for publication in the Communiqué (May 2026), the official publication of the Clark County Bar Association.
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