Written by Joe Tommasino, Esq.
Supreme Court of Nevada
Abortion: (1) Appellants have shown injury for standing and ripeness to challenge the judicial-bypass provisions of Senate Bill 510 (1985); and (2) as to the preliminary injunction, Appellants demonstrated a reasonable likelihood of success on their claim that SB 510 is unconstitutionally vague, appellants demonstrated irreparable harm, and the balance of hardships and public interests favor appellants. In 1985, the Nevada Legislature passed SB 510, requiring persons under age 18 to notify their parent or guardian, or obtain judicial approval, before receiving an abortion. Enforcement of the law was enjoined before it took effect pursuant to federal injunction. Recently, that injunction was vacated, and SB 510 took effect. Planned Parenthood Mar Monte and Dr. Doe sued in state court, challenging the law as unconstitutional. The Supreme Court of Nevada concluded that Appellants demonstrated injury and have standing to challenge aspects of SB 510 and that the matter is ripe for review. As to the preliminary injunction, Appellants demonstrated a reasonable likelihood of success and irreparable harm, and the balance of hardships against public interests favors appellants. Therefore, the Court reversed the order denying the preliminary injunction. Planned Parenthood Mar Monte, Inc. v. State of Nev. (Civil), 142 Nev. Adv. Op. No. 40, ___ P.3d ___ (May 28, 2026).
Alternative-suspect defense: In an alternative-suspect defense to a sexual-assault charge, evidence that the alternative suspect previously committed sexual assault tends to support a propensity inference and thus is relevant to the defense theory. In this case, Appellant Michael Dustin Allen was convicted of two counts of sexual assault with a minor under 14 years of age and one count of lewdness with a child under the age of 14. At trial, he presented an alternative-suspect defense, arguing that A.S.—Allen’s adult son and the victim’s half-brother—was the true perpetrator. In preparing this defense, Allen sought juvenile records showing A.S. had sexually assaulted a stepsister when he was a teenager and the stepsister was around the same age as the instant victim. The district court judge deemed nothing in the records “relevant or material” to the case, and different judges subsequently assigned to the case declined to consider the admissibility of A.S.’s prior sexual assault at trial. The Supreme Court of Nevada held that the district court erred in finding A.S.’s prior offense irrelevant and thereby declining to order the disclosure of his juvenile records. Because that error inhibited the defense’s investigation and prevented Allen from attempting to use A.S.’s prior offense to strengthen his theory of defense at trial, this error was not harmless, and Allen was entitled to a new trial. Allen v. The State of Nevada, 142 Nev. Adv. Op. No. 49, ___ P.3d ___ (July 2, 2026).
Anti-SLAPP statutes: (1) Nevada’s anti-SLAPP statutes, NRS 41.633-.670, are meant to protect against unmeritorious claims and retaliatory lawsuits based on the exercise of the right to free speech under the Nevada and United States Constitutions; (2) this laudable purpose does not require the dismissal of a complaint “in its entirety where it contains claims arising from both protected and unprotected communications;” and (3) when deciding an anti-SLAPP special motion to dismiss, each challenged claim must be reviewed independently. The Supreme Court of Nevada clarified a prior holding compelling trial courts to first review each challenged statement independently under the first prong of the anti-SLAPP analysis to determine whether the alleged statement is protected communication. The burden-shifting second prong of the anti-SLAPP analysis is only employed as to protected communications that satisfy the requirements of the first prong. As the defendants here did not satisfy their burden under the first prong of the anti-SLAPP analysis with respect to some of the communications alleged in the defamation and conspiracy claims, the district court erred in granting defendants’ anti-SLAPP motion in its entirety. Since the defendants did, however, meet their burden under the first prong as to some communications, and the plaintiffs failed to meet their burden under the second prong, the district court properly granted the motion in part. Rosenbrook v. Lloyd C/W 85175, 142 Nev. Adv. Op. No. 36, ___ P.3d ___ (May 14, 2026).
Arbitration: (1) This dispute should have been resolved via arbitration; (2) the City was not entitled to unilaterally deem the grievances untimely and ineligible for arbitration; as a procedural prerequisite, that issue should have been submitted to the arbitrator; (3) given the absence of an edict in the Collective Bargaining Agreement (CBA) specifying otherwise, the format of the arbitration rests within the arbitrator’s discretion, and neither the court nor the parties were authorized to insist upon a particular process; and (4) because the underlying dispute regarding longevity pay is arbitrable, the district court should not have reached the merits of that issue. Nevada law generally recognizes a division of labor between courts and arbitrators in adjudicating arbitration agreements. Absent contractual provisions providing otherwise, district courts determine whether a particular dispute is arbitrable; that is, whether it falls within the scope of the arbitration provision. Beyond that threshold question, the arbitrator evaluates whether procedural prerequisites have been satisfied, chooses the format of arbitration proceedings, and adjudicates the underlying issue. Here, the district court determined that the City of Las Vegas, one of two parties to a CBA containing an arbitration provision, was entitled to dictate the arbitration format and unilaterally determine whether a procedural prerequisite to arbitration had been satisfied. As the CBA did not contain a provision assigning the format and procedural prerequisite determinations, these matters were reserved by default for the arbitrator. The district court erred in finding the City was permitted to unilaterally settle these matters. Moreover, because the arbitrability of the dispute is not in question, the district court erred in ruling on the merits of the longevity-pay issue. Las Vegas Police Protective Assoc. v. City of Las Vegas (Civil), 142 Nev. Adv. Op. No. 41, ___ P.3d ___ (June 4, 2026).
Attorney’s Fees: (1) NRS 22.100(3)’s “incurred” language conveys that the contempt statute compensates and does not punish beyond the attorney-fee award itself; and (2) because the district court calculated the lodestar amount using an increased billing rate without evidence that such was necessary to compensate for actual losses incurred as a result of the contempt, the resulting fee award was neither reasonable nor for fees incurred as a result of the contempt. Trudi and John Lytle appealed an order requiring them to pay the attorney fees their opponents incurred defending a contempt judgment against them on a prior appeal. The district court calculated the award using the lodestar method, which multiplies the hours the attorney reasonably spent on the matter by a reasonable hourly rate. The Lytles raised one main issue: when a fee applicant hires and pays their attorney at the attorney’s standard hourly rate, may a district court use a higher rate as the lodestar multiplier if it finds the attorney’s rate to be below market? The Supreme Court of Nevada held that “for a party with private counsel working at an agreed-upon hourly rate, the actual billing arrangement is a significant, though not necessarily controlling, factor in calculating a fee award.” Depending on the fee-shifting statute involved, a higher-than-billed rate may be appropriate where, for example, the law firm discounted its rates to provide pro bono or public-interest representation. Here, however, there was no evidence of a discount, only the district court’s finding that the firm could have charged more for its work than it did. Because that does not justify an award greater than the fees billed at the agreed-upon rate, the Court reversed and remanded for entry of judgment recalculated at the rate actually charged. Lytle v. September Tr., Dated March 23, 1972, 142 Nev. Adv. Op. No. 50, ___ P.3d ___ (July 2, 2026).
Civil procedure: NRS 629.620 is unconstitutional and of no effect to the extent it pertains to discovery during civil litigation. NRCP 35(a) governs court-ordered mental and physical examinations of a party for purposes of litigation. In 2021, the Supreme Court of Nevada ruled that a statute governing the same, NRS 52.380, unconstitutionally encroached on the inherent power of the judiciary. The Legislature then enacted NRS 629.620, which applies to persons required to undergo a mental or physical examination by court order, contractual obligation, or some other obligation. Like its predecessor, NRS 629.620 permits exam conditions that directly contradict those addressed in NRCP 35. Petitioner challenged a district-court order directing the plaintiff in civil litigation to comply with an examination subject to conditions beyond or contradictory to those in NRCP 35 but arguably allowed by NRS 629.620. The Supreme Court of Nevada held that NRS 629.620 violates the separation-of-powers doctrine to the extent it imposes conditions that conflict with or exceed those that NRCP 35 establishes for court-ordered independent medical or physical examinations during discovery. To the extent NRS 629.620 applies to NRCP 35-based examinations in civil discovery, it is unconstitutional and of no effect. As to the specific conditions challenged, the district court did not abuse its discretion in permitting the disclosure of raw testing data to counsel but did abuse its discretion in allowing for the presence of an interpreter and in allowing the exam to be audio-recorded. Powers v. Dist. Ct. (Bueno) (Civil), 142 Nev. Adv. Op. No. 35, ___ P.3d ___ (May 14, 2026).
Criminal law: (1) The appropriate unit of prosecution for NRS 200.508 is causing a child pain or suffering, and each instance of causing pain or suffering constitutes a separate violation; and (2) either a single charge of child abuse based on continuing conduct or multiple charges of child abuse based on distinct acts of abuse can be charged, as dictated by the circumstances. Child abuse, neglect, or endangerment may be charged under NRS 200.508 as either a single violation or separate violations, depending on the circumstances and way the charge is pleaded. For example, in some circumstances a single distinct act could cause pain or suffering to a child sufficient to sustain a child-abuse charge, such as deliberately breaking the child’s arm. In other circumstances, the requisite pain and suffering could be caused by the cumulative effect of a continuing course of conduct, instead of a single act. For example, failing to provide a child a single meal may be insufficient to warrant a child-abuse charge, but the cumulative effect of starving a child over a period of time may support a child-abuse charge. Thus, independent acts of abuse against the same child can be separate violations of the statute, or multiple acts together can demonstrate a continuing offense and serve as a single violation of the statute, depending on the circumstances and the way the State pleads the charge. Causey (Kasie) v. Dist. Ct. (State) (Criminal), 142 Nev. Adv. Op. No. 43, ___ P.3d ___ (June 18, 2026).
Criminal law: (1) The unit of prosecution for elder-exploitation is 1 count per victim; and (2) as NRS 205.0834 allows the State to aggregate theft crimes only per “scheme or continuing course of conduct,” the single-theme thefts here were improperly aggravated into 15 charges. In Smith v. State, 142 Nev., Adv. Op. 26, 587 P.3d 251, 264 (2026), the Supreme Court of Nevada held that the unit of prosecution for elder exploitation is 1 count per victim; therefore, the Court vacated 14 of 15 counts. With respect to the theft counts, NRS 205.0834 allows the State to aggregate the value of property stolen through acts “committed pursuant to a scheme or continuing course of conduct” in determining what grade of theft to charge. Appellant Maurice Robinson committed thefts in only a single scheme or course of conduct, so the Court vacated 14 theft counts. Robinson (Maurice) v. State (Criminal), 142 Nev. Adv. Op. No. 37, ___ P.3d ___ (May 21, 2026).
Discovery sanctions: A district court cannot issue a discovery sanction for failing to provide required disclosures under NRCP 16.1 that, in effect, is a case-ending sanction without analysis of factors from Young v. Johnny Ribeiro Building, Inc., 106 Nev. 88, 787 P.2d 777 (1990). Appellant Yanling Zhang sued respondent Yanhui Zhang, to recover funds Yanling contributed toward the purchase of investment properties through an alleged joint venture, as well as her share of the venture’s profits. Finding that Yanling failed to provide an adequate computation of damages under NRCP 16.1, the district court granted Yanhui’s motion in limine to exclude all evidence of damages, which in effect barred Yanling from proving the damages element of her claims. As a result, the district court dismissed Yanling’s complaint with prejudice, concluding there was nothing left to litigate. Although the district court did not explicitly issue an NRCP 37(b)(2) discovery sanction of dismissal, granting the motion in limine under NRCP 37(c)(1) and barring any damages evidence from being presented resulted in the termination of the case because damages were an essential element of the asserted claims. Such an action must be supported by clear and thoughtful consideration of the Young factors. Zhang v. Zhang (Civil), 142 Nev. Adv. Op. No. 45, ___ P.3d ___ (June 18, 2026).
Duty-to-stop statutes: (1) Nevada’s duty-to-stop statutes impose clear duties for a driver involved in an accident; (2) here, the defendant satisfied those duties when he stopped, identified himself, and remained while emergency responders arrived and assumed care of the injured without being detained or arrested at the scene; and (3) although the State argued that
a driver must remain until police give permission to leave, the duty-to-stop statutes contain no such requirement. When a driver is involved in a motor-vehicle crash that results in injuries, Nevada law imposes a duty to stop and take certain actions. Nevada’s duty-to-stop statutes, NRS 484E.010 and NRS 484E.030, define those duties, which include providing identification and rendering aid to the injured. Appellant Tyler Carter remained at the scene of an accident, provided necessary identifying information to law enforcement, and stayed until medical professionals assumed care of the injured. Carter was not arrested or detained. Carter left the scene, and the State later charged Carter with violating the duty-to-stop statute. The State secured a conviction on the theory that Carter was required to remain until officers formally released him. Nothing in NRS 484E.010 imposes that requirement. The purpose of NRS 484E.010 is to require drivers involved in an accident to stop and provide identifying information and render reasonable assistance to injured persons for the benefit of any person who may have been injured. The statutory requirement to render “reasonable assistance” does not require a driver to personally administer medical care or to assume control of emergency-response efforts. The statute requires only “reasonable assistance,” and it illustrates that duty by reference to arranging medical transport when necessary or requested. Carter satisfied that duty. Carter (Tyler) v. State (Criminal), 142 Nev. Adv. Op. No. 34, ___ P.3d ___ (May 14, 2026).
Judicial review: In general, a party to a judicial-review proceeding who is aggrieved by a district court’s remand order may challenge the district court’s jurisdiction over that earlier proceeding in a subsequent petition for judicial review once the remanded administrative proceedings have concluded. Parties dissatisfied with an administrative decision may petition for judicial review of the agency’s determination. Upon considering a petition for judicial review, a district court may, if warranted, set aside the administrative decision and remand for new agency proceedings. A district court’s order remanding an agency action for further proceedings generally is not a final determination on the merits and therefore is not appealable. However, upon conclusion of the proceedings on remand, a dissatisfied party may newly petition the district court for judicial review of the final decision pursuant to NRS 233B.130. In addition to contesting the substance of the proceedings on remand, this second petition may also raise jurisdictional issues with the first petition for judicial review. In this appeal from the district court’s order denying appellant Charles Rocha’s petition for judicial review of an agency decision on remand, Rocha sought to void the decision on the basis that the district court lacked jurisdiction to remand the case. Respondent Department of Health and Human Services (DHHS) argued that the issue could not be reached because Rocha’s petition for judicial review was defective, such that the district court lacked jurisdiction to hear it. The Supreme Court of Nevada found that “we cannot reach the merits of Rocha’s argument because we agree with DHHS that Rocha’s subsequent petition did not comply with NRS 233B.130(2)(a) and the district court therefore lacked jurisdiction to consider Rocha’s claim.” Rocha v. State, Dep’t of Health and Human Serv., 142 Nev. Adv. Op. No. 48, ___ P.3d ___ (July 2, 2026).
Lifetime supervision: Sex offenders are not required to register for the full registration period under NRS 179D.490 before the NRS 176.0931 registration requirement is deemed satisfied and the offender becomes eligible for release from lifetime supervision. One of the eligibility requirements for sex offenders to be released from lifetime supervision under NRS 176.0931(3) is compliance with statutory registration requirements. NRS 179D.490 provides a registration period
according to an offender’s tier. NRS 176.0931 does not require completion of that term for an offender to be eligible for release from lifetime supervision. The statutes are not mutually exclusive; the registration obligation persists even if an offender is released from lifetime supervision. Accordingly, an offender is eligible for release from lifetime supervision under NRS 176.0931(3)(a) if they have complied with statutory registration requirements up to the time of petitioning for release. Because the appellant was denied release from lifetime supervision solely because he had not registered for 25 years, the Court reversed the district court’s order. Del Toro (Juan) v. State (Criminal), 142 Nev. Adv. Op. No. 33, ___ P.3d ___ (May 7, 2026).
Major Crimes Act: While the Major Crimes Act (18 U.S.C. § 1153(a)) ordinarily establishes exclusive federal jurisdiction over murders committed by Indian defendants in Indian country, it does not apply where the crimes are interterritorial. Nevada has jurisdiction to prosecute crimes that are “consummated within its boundaries” under NRS 171.015. The question here was whether the State has jurisdiction to prosecute an alleged murder that occurred partially within tribal land and partially within nontribal state territory. The Supreme Court of Nevada held that the offense was completed in nontribal state territory, it was therefore consummated in Nevada, and is the type of offense contemplated by NRS 171.015. The Court then addressed the Major Crimes Act which assigns jurisdiction exclusively to the federal government to prosecute murder, among other enumerated crimes, when committed by a tribal member within tribal land. When three conditions are met—(1) an enumerated crime, (2) is committed by a tribal-member offender, (3) within Indian country—state jurisdiction is preempted. However, crimes spanning across Indian country and nontribal state territory are not committed within Indian country. Thus, 18 USC § 1153(a) does not expressly preempt state jurisdiction over crimes that occur partially within Indian country and partially within Nevada state territory. State v. Salazar (Rocky) (Criminal), 142 Nev. Adv. Op. No. 39, ___ P.3d ___ (May 28, 2026).
Offers of Judgment: (1) The case of Capriati Construction Corp. v. Yahyavi, 137 Nev. 675, 498 P.3d 226 (2021), is overruled insofar as it held that contingency fees are incurred upon judgment; (2) the instant opinion makes clear that district courts must exclude the work done before the offer in considering a reasonable attorney fee award under NRCP 68; (3) to do so, courts should determine a starting amount and make adjustments to account only for the work completed post-offer; and (4) there is no one specific approach required. Because the district court awarded the full contingency fee in the instant case, which was an unreasonable amount given the post-offer work completed, the Court reversed the district court order granting attorney fees and remanded for reconsideration consistent with this opinion. Clark et al v. Marin, 142 Nev. Adv. Op. No. 47, ___ P.3d ___ (July 2, 2026).
Probation revocation: (1) When the probationer challenges the veracity of an arrest report that serves as the basis for a requested probation revocation, the district court cannot solely rely on the presumptive trustworthiness of that report or the justice court’s finding of probable cause in the probationer’s new case; and (2) the district court must independently review the evidence to determine whether the probation violation occurred and warrants revocation. Here, the district court reviewed the preliminary-hearing transcript to substantiate the asserted probation violation based on a new criminal offense and was reasonably satisfied that the defendant committed a nontechnical violation of the terms and conditions of probation, warranting revocation.
That conclusion was not an abuse of discretion. The defendant cross-examined arresting officers at the preliminary hearing, and the only basis for revocation was the new offense that was the subject of the preliminary hearing. Because the defendant was able to actually confront the witness against him, no balancing against the burden of securing additional live testimony from the arresting officers was required. Moreover, the district court allowed the defendant to brief the confrontation issue and present competing evidence and testimony at the revocation hearing, and the court considered the preliminary-hearing transcript and the totality of evidence. The defendant therefore was not denied a neutral and detached hearing body. Accordingly, the Supreme Court of Nevada affirmed the district court’s order revoking the defendant’s probation and imposing his suspended sentence. Garcia (Byron) v. State (Criminal), 142 Nev. Adv. Op. No. 42, ___ P.3d ___ (June 11, 2026).
Professional negligence: (1) When a law includes a list of categories to define a statutory term, the statute must be interpreted to exclude unenumerated categories from that list; (2) EMS providers, who are not enumerated in NRS 41A.017, are not “provider[s] of health care” for purposes of the professional-negligence statutes in NRS Chapter 41A; and (3) ambulances are not “clinic[s].” A plaintiff asserting professional-negligence claims against medical providers must file with the complaint an affidavit from a medical expert to support the claims. Medical professional negligence can be committed only by a “provider of health care,” a phrase that is defined by statute and includes the term “clinic.” Abraham Williams passed away due to cardiac arrest caused by anaphylactic shock. His estate sued the ambulance company that transported him to the hospital, seeking damages for negligence. The ambulance company moved to dismiss on the grounds that the claims against it sounded in professional negligence but the estate failed to file the required supporting affidavit. The district court denied the motion, concluding that neither the ambulance company nor its emergency medical service (EMS) employees fell under the statutory definition of “providers of health care” or equated to a “clinic.” In response, the Supreme Court of Nevada also held that an EMS provider is not a “provider of health care” under NRS 41A.017 and that an ambulance is not a “clinic” for purposes of the medical professional-negligence statutes. Therefore, no expert affidavit was required. RBR Mgmt., LLV v. Dist. Ct. (Williams) (Civil), 142 Nev. Adv. Op. No. 44, ___ P.3d ___ (June 18, 2026).
Taxation: (1) Though the statutory and regulatory criteria for granting tax-exempt status to religious, charitable, and educational organizations are clear, the Nevada Department of Taxation failed to correctly apply them to the Nevada Health & Bioscience Asset Corporation (NHBAC); (2) applications for state sales and use tax exemption by such organizations filed pursuant to NRS 372.326 must be evaluated under the standards for exemption defined in NRS 372.3261; and (3) NRS 372.340 does not apply to nonprofit organizations that receive tax-exempt status under those standards. This case concerns the scope of state sales-and-use-tax exemptions for religious, charitable, or educational organizations that partner with the government. NHBAC is a nonprofit organization established to privately fund and manage the development of a medical-education building for the UNLV School of Medicine. When NHBAC sought a sales-and-use-tax exemption based on its nonprofit status, the Nevada Department of Taxation denied its application under NRS 372.340, which withholds such exemptions from government contractors, thereby launching this dispute over the proper procedure for evaluating this type of application. The Supreme Court of Nevada held that the Department erred by failing to evaluate NHBAC’s application according to the criteria for charitable organizations established in NRS 372.3261 and by reading NRS 372.340 to preclude otherwise-eligible entities from receiving tax-exempt status. Under the correct criteria, NHBAC qualifies for sales-and-use-tax exemption as a charitable organization. Nev. Health and Bioscience Asset Corp. v. State of Nev. (Civil), 142 Nev. Adv. Op. No. 38, ___ P.3d ___ (May 28, 2026).
Nevada Court of Appeals
Parentage: (1) Nevada’s presumptive parentage statutes are equitable in nature and shall not be restricted on the basis of sex, marital status, or biological connection except in limited circumstances; and (2) a putative parent has standing to bring an action to determine the existence of a parent-child relationship and, once standing is established, may pursue legal recognition of that relationship by invoking and attempting to prove presumptive parentage status, even when that individual is not included in a gestational agreement as an intended parent, unless they consented to be omitted as an intended parent. Even if the putative parent satisfies the applicable requirements under NRS 126.051(1) for maternity and establishes presumptive parentage status, the district court must allow the parent named in the gestational agreement the opportunity to rebut the presumptive parent’s claim. If the district court determines the presumption is not appropriately rebutted, then the court shall consider the presumptive parent as holding full parentage status and move forward to determine the custody arrangement that is in the best interest of the child. But if the district court finds that the parentage presumption is appropriately rebutted, then judgment must be entered against the putative parent. In this case, which involves a gestational agreement with a surrogate parent, Appellant invoked NRS 126.051(1) to establish standing to bring a maternity and custody action against respondent. In her complaint, Appellant alleged sufficient facts to support her claim that she was the presumptive mother of the minor child, giving her standing as an interested party to bring a parentage claim. Yet, the district court granted respondent’s motion to dismiss Appellant’s complaint for lack of standing because she had no genetic link to the minor child, was not married to the child’s biological father, and was not included as an intended parent in the gestational agreement. This was error. Lorenzo v. Gendebien (Child Custody), 142 Nev. Adv. Op. No. 46, ___ P.3d ___ (June 18, 2026).
Resources
- “Advance Opinions” are viewable at this link: http://nvcourts.gov/Supreme/Decisions/Advance_Opinions/
- A list of “Forthcoming Opinions” is available at this link every Wednesday: http://nvcourts.gov/Supreme/Decisions/Forthcoming_Opinions/
- “Supreme Court Unpublished Orders” are viewable at this link: http://nvcourts.gov/Supreme/Decisions/Unpublished_Orders/
- “Court of Appeals Unpublished Orders” are viewable at this link: http://nvcourts.gov/Supreme/Decisions/Court_of_Appeals/Unpublished_Orders/
About the author
Joe Tommasino has served as Staff Attorney for the Las Vegas Justice Court since 1996. Joe is the President of the Nevada Association for Court Career Advancement (NACCA).
About the article
© 2026 Clark County Bar Association (CCBA). All rights reserved. No reproduction of any portion of this issue is allowed without written permission from the publisher. Editorial policy available upon request.
This article was originally submitted for publication in the Communiqué (Aug 2026), the official publication of the Clark County Bar Association.
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