Written by Joe Tommasino, Esq.
Supreme Court of Nevada
Amending complaints: District courts should liberally grant leave to file amended pleadings when the law governing a proceeding changes while the proceeding is ongoing. Such an amendment promotes resolving disputes on their merits and works against the unjust circumstance where a party commences an action only to have the legal ground beneath its feet shift as the litigation plays out. Here, a case changed the applicable law regarding pleading standards for tort claims against corporate officers and directors. As a result, the district court should have given more weight to that consideration in reviewing a motion for leave to file an amended complaint. State, Comm’r of Ins. V. Chur C/W 85728, 141 Nev. Adv. Op. No. 69, ___ P.3d ___ (December 23, 2025).
Extensions of time: (1) A party may not rely on a belated request for a “professional courtesy” as good cause for missing a deadline; and (2) where, as in this case, a party fails to present his or her opposition to a motion, that “[f]ailure … may be construed as an admission that the motion is meritorious and a consent to granting the same.” While facts may change from case to case, rules of procedure are constant. In the instant case, the Supreme Court of Nevada could not say that the district court abused its discretion by enforcing the rules. Therefore, the district court did not err in rejecting the proposition that a hoped-for 11th-hour extension of time based on professional courtesy amounted to good cause. Additionally, the district court did not abuse its discretion in granting the unopposed motion to dismiss with prejudice under DCR 13(3). El Cortez Reno Hld’s, LLC v. PFPCO.’s Noble Pie Parlor C/W 88370, 141 Nev. Adv. Op. No. 68, ___ P.3d ___ (December 23, 2025).
Foreclosure: (1) This is an appeal from a judgment quieting title in favor of the buyer at a homeowners’ association (HOA) lien foreclosure sale and against the bank holding a first deed of trust on the property; (2) before the sale, the homeowner made payments to the HOA that were sufficient to pay off its superpriority lien; (3) these payments converted the sale to a subpriority lien foreclosure sale, and the homeowner did not need to also pay off the separate superpriority lien that a second HOA held on the property for this conversion to occur; and (4) because a subpriority lien is junior to a first deed of trust, the bank’s first deed of trust remained an encumbrance against the property and the foreclosure sale buyer took title subject to the deed of trust. If a homeowner fails to pay HOA assessments, the HOA may assert a lien and foreclose on the property. NRS 116.3116 splits an HOA lien into two parts: a superpriority piece, which is senior to a first deed of trust; and a subpriority piece, which is junior to a first deed of trust. In the absence of express allocation by the debtor, an HOA may not direct payments in a way that preserves the HOA’s superpriority lien to the detriment of the homeowner and bank in whose interest it is to protect the first deed of trust by paying off the superpriority lien. When two HOAs record liens against the same property, the pre-sale payment of the foreclosing HOA’s superpriority lien converts its sale to a subpriority-lien-only sale; nothing requires the non-foreclosing HOA’s superpriority lien to also be paid off for that conversion to occur. Deutsche Bank Nat’l Tr. Co. v. Collegium Fund LLC Ser. 16, 142 Nev. Adv. Op. No. 1, ___ P.3d ___ (January 8, 2026).
Juvenile court: A juvenile court order finally resolving a petition for child protection under NRS Chapter 432B is appealable as a final judgment under NRAP 3A(b)(1). Here, the appellants challenged a juvenile court order dismissing a petition for child protection under NRS Chapter 432B. In In re A.B., 128 Nev. 764, 769, 291 P.3d 122, 126 (2012), the Supreme Court of Nevada determined that such an order, arising from juvenile proceedings and involving child custody, was not appealable. In the instant case, the Court recognized that the jurisdictional analysis in In re A.B. is flawed; the Court overruled In re A.B. in part; and the Court concluded that an order dismissing and thus completely resolving NRS Chapter 432B proceedings is appealable as a final judgment under NRAP 3A(b)(1). Because the juvenile court order challenged here completely resolves the NRS Chapter 432B proceedings, it is a final judgment appealable under NRAP 3A(b)(1), and this appeal may proceed. In re: N.D., G.D., and M.D. (Family), 142 Nev. Adv. Op. No. 2, ___ P.3d ___ (January 8, 2026).
Personal jurisdiction: (1) Specific jurisdiction requires that a defendant purposefully avail itself of the forum state and that a plaintiff’s injuries arise out of or relate to the defendant’s contacts with the state; (2) in determining whether a defendant’s stream-of-commerce contacts satisfy the relatedness requirements, courts may look at divergent streams of commerce, including the end-product stream of commerce and the derivative-product stream of commerce; and (3) when there is a disconnect between a defendant’s contacts and the harm alleged by the plaintiff in the complaint, specific jurisdiction may not lie with the forum court. Appellant Roberto Franceschi, a Nevada resident, was injured when a lithium-ion battery exploded in his front pocket, causing severe burns. Franceschi sued the battery manufacturer, respondent LG Chem, a Korean company, and its American subsidiary, respondent LG Chem America, Inc. (collectively, LG) for products liability in Nevada district court. The court, concluding that Franceschi’s claims were insufficiently related to LG’s contacts with Nevada, dismissed the lawsuit for lack of personal jurisdiction. On appeal, the Supreme Court of Nevada held that the district court did not err. While LG purposefully availed the Nevada forum through certain specific contacts, the harm alleged by Franceschi did not arise out of or relate to those contacts. LG placed lithium-ion batteries into the forum through an end-product stream of commerce, meaning it sold the batteries to sophisticated companies for incorporation in specific applications, like power tools, which were eventually sold in Nevada. However, Franceschi’s injuries arose from an individual battery cell that arrived in the forum through a distinct stream of commerce—a derivative-product stream of commerce—through an unknown third-party vendor; LG did not sell individual battery cells for consumer use in Nevada. This disconnect between LG’s contacts with the forum and the harm alleged by Franceschi forecloses the exercise of personal jurisdiction over LG. Franceschi v. LG Chem, Ltd., 141 Nev. Adv. Op. No. 65, ___ P.3d ___ (December 18, 2025).
Professional negligence: (1) To determine whether a claim sounds in professional negligence for purposes of NRS Chapter 41A, the central question is “whether the claim pertains to an action that occurred within the course of a professional relationship”; (2) for an ordinary negligence claim against a health-care provider to survive as a stand-alone claim, it must be based on conduct that is independent of the medical relationship; and (3) claims that are inextricably or inherently linked to actions occurring during the course of a medical relationship between a patient and a health-care provider sound in professional negligence and remain subject to the requirements and limitations for professional-negligence actions set forth in NRS Chapter 41A. In this case, Scott Freeman was allegedly discharged in the middle of the night from petitioner Renown Regional Medical Center after being treated for mere hours. Scott’s wife, real party in interest Melissa Freeman, was traveling at the time, so there was no adult in the home to receive Scott or provide him with care following his discharge. When Melissa arrived home in the morning, she found Scott unconscious. Scott later died. Melissa sued Renown, petitioner Emilie Hyland, RN, and several other entities and individuals, asserting professional negligence and ordinary negligence. Petitioners moved to dismiss the ordinary negligence claim, arguing that it sounded in professional negligence. The district court denied that motion. The court also denied petitioners’ subsequent motion for reconsideration, concluding the decision to discharge Scott was, at least partially, an administrative decision that sounded in ordinary negligence. Petitioners challenged the district court’s rulings by way of a petition for a writ of mandamus. The Supreme Court of Nevada stated that NRS 41A.015 defines “[p]rofessional negligence” as “the failure of a provider of health care, in rendering services, to use the reasonable care, skill, or knowledge ordinarily used under similar circumstances by similarly trained and experienced providers of health care.” NRS 41A.017 lists the providers of health care to which NRS 41A.015 applies. Because the parties did not dispute that petitioners are providers of health care, the Supreme Court of Nevada only needed to address whether Melissa’s claim sounds in professional negligence, as defined by NRS 41A.015. In Limprasert v. PAM Specialty Hospital of Las Vegas LLC, 140 Nev. ––––, 550 P.3d 825 (2024), the Supreme Court indicated that NRS 41A.015’s definition suggests that a claim arising from services rendered within the course of the relationship between a patient and a health-care provider sounds in professional negligence. Thus, “[t]he sole inquiry is whether the claim involves a provider of health care rendering services in a way that causes injury.” This analysis does not depend “on the complexity of proving a claim” or “whether an expert affidavit or expert testimony is needed for a jury to understand the allegations.” Instead, the relevant analysis is whether the “gravamen” of a claim is based on allegations of a “breach of duty involving medical judgment, diagnosis, or treatment.” Where the underlying allegations “are inextricably linked to professional negligence,” parties cannot “circumvent NRS Chapter 41A’s requirements” by framing the claim as one for “negligent hiring, training, and supervision.” If a negligent action occurs during the course of the medical relationship, any legal claim stemming from that negligent action sounds in professional negligence, not ordinary negligence. In other words, for an ordinary negligence claim against a health-care provider to survive as a stand-alone claim, it must be based on conduct that is independent of the medical relationship. Renown Regional Med. Center v. Dist. Ct. (Freeman) (Civil), 141 Nev. Adv. Op. No. 64, ___ P.3d ___ (December 11, 2025).
Reasonable suspicion: Mere proximity to a person who was under surveillance and then arrested does not, standing alone, support detaining and searching the arrestee’s companion; reasonable suspicion is individualized. The invocation of officer safety does not provide a blank check to stop a person absent specific articulable facts that the person committed, is committing, or will commit a crime. Clearly, when executing a lawful arrest, police may direct the arrestee’s companion or companions to step away and not interfere. But police may not stop companions of whom no crime is suspected—mere association with the suspect is not criminal and does not satisfy the required constitutional burden. State v. Dubuc (Ricky) (Criminal), 141 Nev. Adv. Op. No. 67, ___ P.3d ___ (December 23, 2025).
Trusts: (1) NRS 164.041 and NRS 669A.256 allow for certain trust-related documents to be sealed provisionally, but the district court must still promptly conduct a proper analysis as to each document to determine whether demonstrated interests overcome the presumption of openness and warrant continued closure; and (2) this includes making specific, nonspeculative findings to support any claimed privacy rights and giving due weight to the public’s right of access to judicial proceedings and records. Relying on statutes that permit the sealing and redaction of certain documents in trust proceedings, the district court ordered nearly all documents in the underlying case sealed and closed the proceedings. The court concluded that the statutes granted real parties in interest a right to keep the information confidential and found that it could not protect that information from disclosure unless it closed all proceedings. While the district court pointed to statutory authority and privacy and security concerns, its decision to broadly seal the record and close the proceedings exceeds the scope of Nevada law. The district court erred by interpreting and applying the applicable statutes, NRS 164.041 and NRS 669A.256, in a way that is much more restrictive of public access than those statutes contemplate and disregards established principles of openness of court proceedings. Although the statutes allow for provisional sealing of certain documents, they also vest the district court with discretion to determine whether continued sealing is compatible with public access principles. The district court’s finding that real parties in interest had a compelling interest warranting the sealing of all documents and closure of all proceedings lacks support, as the statutes’ classification of certain documents as “confidential” does not, by itself, establish a compelling privacy interest. Because the district court did not make the necessary, nonspeculative factual findings to support a significant privacy interest or a substantial probability of harm absent sealing and closure, the Supreme Court of Nevada granted the petitioner media outlets’ petition for a writ of mandamus. New York Times Co. v. Dist. Ct. (Doe 1 Trust) (Civil), 141 Nev. Adv. Op. No. 71, ___ P.3d ___ (December 23, 2025).
Nevada Court of Appeals
Computation of time served: Legislative changes to NRS Chapter 34 require the district court to dismiss without prejudice a postconviction habeas petition challenging the computation of time served where the petitioner did not first exhaust all available administrative remedies. The Nevada Legislature intended the exhaustion requirement to act as a procedural bar to a postconviction habeas petition challenging the computation of time served. Although the district court erroneously denied the underlying petitions on the merits without first determining whether the petitioners had exhausted all available administrative remedies, the Court of Appeals nevertheless concluded that the district court properly denied the requested relief because the petitions should have been dismissed without prejudice. Hall (Kenya) v. Warden (Criminal) C/W 90152, 141 Nev. Adv. Op. No. 70, ___ P.3d ___ (December 23, 2025).
Guardianship: Because a custodial relative who serves as a guardian has a liberty interest in the care, custody, and management of a child under their protection, such a guardian is entitled to notice and an opportunity to be heard before a district court may sua sponte remove that guardian and terminate the guardianship. In this case, the district court terminated the appellants’ guardianship over their minor granddaughters, without adequate notice or any opportunity to be heard, after receiving two confidential reports from a reunification therapist pursuant to the Nevada Statewide Rules for Guardianship (NSRG), Rule 5. Although the district court scheduled an NSRG 5 hearing to address one of those reports, it failed to notify the parties that it was contemplating removal or termination of the guardianship, and it denied appellants any opportunity to respond to the allegations in the reports at the hearing. Thus, the district court violated the appellants’ rights to procedural due process. In re: Guardianship of A.L.R.-Q., A.R.W. and A.M.W. (Child Custody), 141 Nev. Adv. Op. No. 66, ___ P.3d ___ (December 23, 2025).
Legal malpractice: (1) This appeal addresses whether a daughter, as an intended third-party beneficiary, may sue a settlor’s attorney for legal malpractice to seek compensation for having not received the share of trust assets that the settlor intended, or, alternatively, if she is left without a remedy; and (2) because there are circumstances where a third-party beneficiary may have standing to file suit against a settlor’s attorney for legal malpractice in a transactional matter, the district court erred in dismissing the complaint for lack of standing as a matter of law. The Court of Appeals adopted the balancing test articulated in Lucas v. Hamm, 56 Cal.2d 583, 15 Cal.Rptr. 821, 364 P.2d 685, 687-88 (1961), as this test provides a remedy for third-party beneficiaries while still protecting the legal profession from unforeseen liability in transactional matters. The Court of Appeals also noted that transactional legal malpractice claims are ripe once the plaintiff incurs costs litigating the validity or meaning of the challenged documents. Bernstein v. Morris (Civil), 141 Nev. Adv. Op. No. 72, ___ P.3d ___ (December 23, 2025).
Resources
- “Advance Opinions” are viewable at this link: http://nvcourts.gov/Supreme/Decisions/Advance_Opinions/
- A list of “Forthcoming Opinions” is available at this link every Wednesday: http://nvcourts.gov/Supreme/Decisions/Forthcoming_Opinions/
- “Supreme Court Unpublished Orders” are viewable at this link: http://nvcourts.gov/Supreme/Decisions/Unpublished_Orders/
- “Court of Appeals Unpublished Orders” are viewable at this link: http://nvcourts.gov/Supreme/Decisions/Court_of_Appeals/Unpublished_Orders/
About the author
Joe Tommasino has served as Staff Attorney for the Las Vegas Justice Court since 1996. Joe is the President of the Nevada Association for Court Career Advancement (NACCA).
About the article
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This article was originally submitted for publication in the Communiqué (February 2026), the official publication of the Clark County Bar Association.
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