Written by Joe Tommasino, Esq.
Supreme Court of Nevada
Appeals: No statute or court rule authorizes an appeal from an interlocutory district court order imposing sanctions. The case of Mona v. Eighth Judicial District Court, 132 Nev. 719, 724, 380 P.3d 836, 840 (2016) does not alter the general rule that, where there is no final judgment and no court rule or statute otherwise authorizing the appeal, the Supreme Court of Nevada lacks jurisdiction to review interlocutory orders imposing sanctions against a party to the case. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co. v. Geist (Civil), 141 Nev. Adv. Op. No. 14, ___ P.3d ___ (March 20, 2025).
Competency: (1) NRS 178.425(4) does not allow a district court to revisit its determination of incompetency without input from the Administrator of the Division of Public and Behavioral Health or their designee; and (2) the district court in this case manifestly abused its discretion in doing just that. When a defendant who is charged with a felony is found incompetent to stand trial, NRS 178.425 mandates that proceedings against the defendant must be suspended until the Administrator or their designee determines competency has been restored. Because the district court here abused its discretion by finding a defendant competent to stand trial without any input from a competency treatment facility after previously finding the defendant incompetent to stand trial, the Supreme Court of Nevada granted mandamus relief. Price (Anthony) v. Dist. Ct. (State), 141 Nev. Adv. Op. No. 17, ___ P.3d ___ (April 17, 2025).
Contracts: (1) A person may contractually waive a statute-of-limitations defense; and (2) while this is the minority approach in the United States, the Supreme Court of Nevada does not share the same public-policy concerns that underlie the majority approach, particularly when Nevada law allows for litigation waivers of a statute-of-limitations defense. Respondent Jackie L. Robinson personally guaranteed several loans that appellant MMV Investments LLC extended to respondents Dribble Dunk LLC and All Net, LLC. In the underlying litigation, the district court determined that MMV’s breach-of-guaranty claim against Robinson was not legally viable because the statute of limitations had expired on MMV’s breach-of-contract claims against Dribble Dunk and All Net. The Supreme Court of Nevada concluded that this was error because Robinson’s guaranty expressly stated that Robinson would be responsible for repaying the loans even if MMV’s claims against Dribble Dunk and All Net became time-barred. Consistent with Nevada law treating the statute of limitations as an affirmative defense that is waived if not raised, the Court held that Robinson was free to waive any statute-of-limitations defense by contract. MMV Invs. LLC v. Dribble Dunk, LLC, 141 Nev. Adv. Op. No. 13, ___ P.3d ___ (March 13, 2025).
Contracts: When a contractual provision is unambiguous, its interpretation presents a matter of law for the court to resolve, not a jury. The legal conflict before the trial court was not complex: a dispute regarding a contract between two parties for purposes of providing irrigation water to a golf course. The trial court, however, misinterpreted the lease agreement for these shares of water. Built on the foundation of the court’s misreading of a critical provision, the court held a jury trial rife with error, after which the jury was tasked with resolving questions of law that were properly within the province of the court. The trial court also allowed inflammatory and inappropriate opening statements, improperly took judicial notice of its own factfinding, implemented unfair trial practices, and incorrectly instructed the jury. Thus, the Supreme Court of Nevada remanded this case for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. Virgin Valley Water Dist. v. Paradise Canyon, LLC, 141 Nev. Adv. Op. No. 19, ___ P.3d ___ (April 24, 2025).
Crashes: (1) NRS 484E.040 sets forth a driver’s duty to provide notice when they are involved in a crash with any vehicle or property that is left unattended, resulting in damage; and (2) NRS 484E.040 does not apply on private property and therefore was not enforceable against a defendant for a hit-and-run incident in a Walmart parking lot. NRS 484A.400 states that “[t]he provisions of chapters 484A to 484E, inclusive, of NRS are applicable and uniform throughout this State on all highways to which the public has a right of access, to which persons have access as invitees or licensees or such other premises as provided by statute.” Applying general principles of English grammar, the phrase “to which persons have access as invitees or licensees” modifies “highways,” not “such other premises.” For example, a highway that runs through a state park that is only accessible after paying for a pass is a highway to which persons have access as invitees or licensees, where the public at large does not have a right of access. The State argued that because the word “any” in NRS 484E.040 modifies both the offending vehicle and the unattended vehicle in a crash scenario, the statute is enforceable anywhere in Nevada; however, NRS 484A.400 does not allow such an interpretation. Because NRS 484E.040 does not identify “such other premises” to which the statute applies aside from highways, the default uniform application to “all highways to which the public has a right of access” or all highways “to which persons have access as invitees or licensees” governs. While the State argued that common sense dictates that NRS 484E.040 should apply to locations such as private parking lots, the Nevada Legislature did not include any location other than highways in NRS 484E.040, and it is not the Supreme Court’s role to question the wisdom or justness of a particular statute. Urias (Brandon) v. Dist. Ct. (State) (Criminal), 141 Nev. Adv. Op. No. 24, ___ P.3d ___ (May 8, 2025).
Guardianship: Under NRS 159A.061(3), a felony conviction does not automatically disqualify a petitioner from being appointed as a guardian for a minor. NRS 159A.061indicates that “the court shall consider, if applicable and without limitation,” six enumerated factors in determining whether a proposed guardian is qualified and suitable. Relevant to the facts of this case, the district court must consider whether a potential guardian “has been convicted in this State or any other jurisdiction of a felony.” Ultimately, when making a guardianship determination, the district court must always act in the best interest of the child. In this opinion, the Supreme Court of Nevada found that NRS 159A.061(3) is clear and unambiguous. Under the plain language of the statute, the district court is required to consider enumerated factors under NRS 159A.061(3) when determining whether the proposed guardian is qualified and suitable. But no one factor is necessarily dispositive under the plain language of the statute. NRS 159A.061(3) provides a framework to guide the district court’s inquiry, identifying factors that are relevant when determining a potential guardian’s suitability. The statute, however, is devoid of any reference to a hierarchy of the enumerated factors and does not contain a list of factors that would necessarily characterize a potential guardian as unfit. Under the usual canons of statutory construction, the Court recognized that if the Nevada Legislature intended a felony conviction to categorically disqualify a potential guardian, it would have provided so in Nevada law. But it did not. And the Court will not read into the statute an automatic disqualification provision when such is contrary to the statute’s plain text. Instead, NRS 159A.061(3) requires that the district court take into account any felony conviction when determining whether a proposed guardian is suitable, but a felony conviction is only one factor to consider. The district court must consider any felony conviction, along with other applicable NRS 159A.061 factors, when determining whether a potential guardian is qualified and suitable. On a separate issue, the Court found that the district court did not abuse its discretion in finding that service was improper based upon noncompliance with NRS 159A.047(2). The inquiry thus shifted to NRS 159A.0475(4), which provides that the district court may find an exception to the normal notice requirements if the statutory criteria are met. In other words, the statute leaves the ultimate decision to the district court’s discretion. Declining to excuse the failure to comply with the normal service requirements cannot be said to exceed the bounds of reason or amount to an arbitrary or capricious decision here because the criteria for an exception were not satisfied under NRS 159A.0475(4). Therefore, the Supreme Court of Nevada concluded that the district court properly determined that service was defective in this case. The Supreme Court noted, however, that denials or dismissals for failure to timely serve process are not on the merits and should be issued without prejudice in the future. In re: Guardianship of H.B. III, 141 Nev. Adv. Op. No. 15, ___ P.3d ___ (April 3, 2015).
Parole: (1) NRS 213.12135(1)(a) provides for parole eligibility for a juvenile nonhomicide offender after 15 calendar years of incarceration by operation of law; and (2) the statute does not require resentencing or amendment of the underlying judgment of conviction, even if that judgment states that the offender is eligible for parole after an aggregate prison term in excess of 15 years. In 2015, the Nevada Legislature enacted NRS 213.12135(1), which provides that juvenile offenders are eligible for parole after a set number of years–15 years if the juvenile offender was convicted of a nonhomicide offense and 20 years if the offender was convicted of an offense resulting in the death of a single victim. Appellant, a juvenile offender who was convicted of nonhomicide offenses and sentenced to an aggregate prison term with parole eligibility after 16 years, contended that this sentence is illegal and that the judgment of conviction must be amended to reflect the 15-year parole eligibility date under NRS 213.12135(1)(a). The Supreme Court of Nevada stated that NRS 213.12135(1) confers parole eligibility without any further action required by the sentencing court, and the statute applies to the aggregate term of imprisonment imposed by the sentencing court. Accordingly, a juvenile nonhomicide offender will be parole eligible after serving 15 years, even if the judgment of conviction states an aggregate term with parole eligibility after more than 15 years. A sentence providing for parole eligibility after an aggregate term in excess of 15 years, however, does not render the sentence imposed illegal where the sentence otherwise conforms with the sentencing statutes for the offenses committed. Thus, the appellant’s sentence providing for parole eligibility after 16 years was not illegal in this case. Garcia (Jonathan) v. State, 141 Nev. Adv. Op. No. 16, ___ P.3d ___ (April 17, 2025).
Probation: (1) NRS 176A.510 requires graduated sanctions for technical probation violations; and (2) obstructing or resisting an officer by flight, and failure to register with law enforcement as a convicted person within 48 hours, are not categorically crimes of violence, absent specific factual findings to support a conclusion that either crime constituted one of violence. In the instant case, the defendant had previously pleaded guilty to a felony and was sentenced to a suspended prison term of 12-30 months with a definite probationary period of 24 months. While on probation, he was subsequently convicted of two misdemeanors: obstructing or resisting an officer by flight in violation of Reno Municipal Code 8.06.010(b)(4) and failure to register with law enforcement as a convicted person within 48 hours in violation of NRS 179C.100(1). The State successfully moved in the district court to revoke the defendant’s probation on grounds that the two misdemeanors were nontechnical violations of his probation because they constituted crimes of violence. The defendant appealed from the district court order revoking his probation, arguing that the district court erred because his two convictions were nonviolent misdemeanors entitling him to graduated sanctions under NRS 176A.510. Because the district court failed to support its findings with specific facts showing that the defendant’s convictions constitute crimes of violence amounting to nontechnical probation violations, the Supreme Court of Nevada reversed the district court’s revocation of probation and remanded this matter to district court. On remand, the district court must consider the imposition of graduated sanctions under NRS 176A.510 for the technical parole violations. Sheridan (Quashawn) v. State (Criminal), 141 Nev. Adv. Op. No. 22, ___ P.3d ___ (April 24, 2025).
Second Amendment: In light of New York State Rifle & Pistol Ass’n, Inc. v. Bruen, 597 U.S. 1, 142 S.Ct. 2111, 213 L.Ed.2d 387 (2022), the Nevada statutes challenged here do not violate the Second Amendment right to keep and bear arms. In the instant case, the defendant was charged with carrying a concealed firearm without a permit, along with possession of a firearm not imprinted with a serial number. When faced with a constitutional challenge to a statute regulating firearms, a court must determine (1) whether the regulated conduct is covered under the plain text of the Second Amendment’s protections, and if so, (2) whether the regulation is consistent with America’s historical tradition of gun regulation. Because NRS 202.350(1)(d)(3) prohibits only the carrying of a concealed weapon in public without a permit, it does not infringe upon the Second Amendment right to publicly carry firearms for self-defense. Notably, no law in the State of Nevada would have prevented the defendant from openly carrying a firearm. As to the other count, NRS 202.364(1) does not regulate conduct protected by the Second Amendment because it does not infringe on a law-abiding citizen’s right to keep and bear arms for self-defense and other lawful purposes. Accordingly, the challenged statutes do not implicate presumptively protected conduct under Bruen’s two-part framework or, consequently, violate the Second Amendment of the United States Constitution. Cocking (Samuel) v. State, 141 Nev. Adv. Op. No. 21, ___ P.3d ___ (April 24, 2025).
Shareholders’ actions: (1) For a claim to be derivative, the corporation must have suffered the harm and it must receive the direct benefit of any remedy, not the suing shareholders (although they may benefit indirectly); and (2) for a claim to be direct, the shareholders individually must have suffered the harm, and they must be the direct recipient of any remedy. When a corporation enters Chapter 7 bankruptcy, the property it owns— including its legal claims—becomes part of the bankruptcy estate. Thus, derivative claims—the corporation’s own claims—become part of the bankruptcy estate. The bankruptcy trustee has exclusive standing to assert derivative claims. Unless sold or abandoned with the bankruptcy court’s approval, the estate’s property—including its claims against third parties— remain part of the bankruptcy estate, even after discharge. Here, because the shareholders’ breach-of-fiduciary-duty claim against Petitioners is derivative, the shareholders lack standing because the claim is part of the corporation’s bankruptcy estate. Black v. Dist. Ct. (Goodchild), 141 Nev. Adv. Op. No. 18, ___ P.3d ___ (April 17, 2025).
Strict liability: A trademark licensor whose role is limited to licensing its trademark cannot be held strictly liable for damages caused by the defective product because the trademark licensor was not substantially involved in the product’s design, manufacture, or distribution. This holding does not foreclose the imposition of strict liability in cases where the trademark licensor occupies a more significant role in the product’s chain of distribution by substantially participating in the design, manufacture, or distribution of the product. Nor does this holding preclude other claims against licensors that do not sound in strict liability. Most importantly, this decision leaves unimpeded the ability of injured plaintiffs to pursue strict liability against those who design, manufacture, distribute, or sell a dangerously defective product. Hernandez v. The Home Depot, Inc. (NRAP 5), 141 Nev. Adv. Op. No. 23, ___ P.3d ___ (May 1, 2025).
Termination of parental rights: (1) Whether to terminate parental rights is a serious decision that should be made with the utmost care; (2) termination petitions initiated by a private party present unique challenges and considerations that differ from those arising from petitions initiated by the state; and (3) accordingly, district courts are instructed to consider such questions and to carefully review the motivations and circumstances surrounding private termination petitions. The termination of one’s parental rights is “tantamount to imposition of a civil death penalty.” Due to its drastic nature, the termination of parental rights is frequently viewed as a last resort, sought only when severing parental ties is the best way to protect the best interests of a child. Because termination is used as a protective measure, petitions to terminate parental rights are most often initiated by the State of Nevada, which possesses an interest in protecting the welfare of children. However, a minority of states, including Nevada, allow entities or individuals that are not affiliated with the state to initiate termination proceedings. Nevada’s statutes do not distinguish between petitions initiated by a private party, such as another parent, and petitions initiated by the state. With such a significant right at stake, the Supreme Court of Nevada decided to clarify Nevada’s termination laws in this context. In this opinion, the Court highlighted the distinctions between privately initiated termination petitions and those initiated by the state, and it outlined why these distinctions are of consequence. The motivations, considerations, and backgrounds of privately initiated termination petitions present a unique set of circumstances often not present in petitions initiated by the state. Thus, the Court encouraged district courts to approach private petitions carefully and with a watchful eye for these distinctions. After reviewing the private termination action in this case, the Court concluded that the district court’s findings of parental fault are not supported by substantial evidence. In re: Parental Rights as to R.A.S., 141 Nev. Adv. Op. No. 20, ___ P.3d ___ (April 24, 2025).
Resources
- “Advance Opinions” are viewable at this link: http://nvcourts.gov/Supreme/Decisions/Advance_Opinions/
- A list of “Forthcoming Opinions” is available at this link every Wednesday: http://nvcourts.gov/Supreme/Decisions/Forthcoming_Opinions/
- “Supreme Court Unpublished Orders” are viewable at this link: http://nvcourts.gov/Supreme/Decisions/Unpublished_Orders/
- “Court of Appeals Unpublished Orders” are viewable at this link: http://nvcourts.gov/Supreme/Decisions/Court_of_Appeals/Unpublished_Orders/
About the author
Joe Tommasino has served as Staff Attorney for the Las Vegas Justice Court since 1996. Joe is the President of the Nevada Association for Court Career Advancement (NACCA).
About the article
© 2025 Clark County Bar Association (CCBA). All rights reserved. No reproduction of any portion of this issue is allowed without written permission from the publisher. Editorial policy available upon request.
This article was originally submitted for publication in the Communiqué (June/July 2025), the official publication of the Clark County Bar Association.
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