Written by Joe Tommasino, Esq.
Supreme Court of Nevada
Alternative dispute resolution: (1) NRS 38.300 through 38.360 create an alternative dispute resolution (ADR) program for disputes involving a residential common-interest community’s covenants, conditions, or restrictions (CC&Rs); (2) with specified exceptions, NRS 38.310 requires that parties submit CC&R-based claims to mediation or nonbinding arbitration before asserting them in court; (3) in the instant case, the appellant argued that NRS 38.310 is “jurisdictional” and that, because the parties did not comply with its pre-suit ADR requirement, the district court lacked subject-matter jurisdiction to decide the case; and (4) by its terms, NRS 38.310 does not limit the district court’s jurisdiction; instead, it is a procedural claim-processing rule that must be enforced if timely invoked but that can be forfeited or waived. NRS 38.310 requires a party to submit the CC&R-based claims it covers to mediation before asserting them in court. The question presented in this case was whether the statute is “jurisdictional” or instead a “claim-processing rule.” “Jurisdictional” statutes are those that “describe the classes of cases a court may entertain (subject matter jurisdiction) or the persons over whom a court may exercise adjudicatory authority (personal jurisdiction).” Claim-processing rules, on the other hand, do not implicate the court’s adjudicatory authority. Rather, they seek to promote the orderly progress of litigation by requiring that parties take certain procedural steps at certain specified times. If a court lacks subject-matter jurisdiction, its proceedings and any resulting judgment are void. Because jurisdictional requirements implicate the court’s adjudicatory authority, they can be raised at any time, even after judgment, and are ordinarily not subject to waiver or forfeiture. A claim-processing rule, by contrast, can be mandatory, meaning it must be enforced if timely and properly raised, but nonetheless nonjurisdictional because it can be forfeited or waived. And because they are not jurisdictional, claim-processing rules do not render a judgment void under NRCP 60(b)(4) if their requirements are not met. The Supreme Court of Nevada determined that NRS 38.310 does not qualify as jurisdictional because the statutory provisions speak to the parties’ procedural obligations, not the court’s authority. Therefore, the district court had jurisdiction to enter judgment in this case. Kosor, Jr. v. S. Highlands Cmty. Ass’n, 141 Nev. Adv. Op. No. 34, ___ P.3d ___ (June 18, 2025).
Appeals: The State has the right, equally with the defendant, to appeal a district-court order granting or denying a motion to correct an illegal sentence. No statute or court rule specifically addresses the right to appeal from an order granting or denying a motion to modify a sentence or a motion to correct an illegal sentence, but the Supreme Court has analogized an order resolving a motion to modify a sentence to an order resolving a motion for a new trial, which is appealable by the State or defendant (whichever is aggrieved) under NRS 177.015(1)(b). In both instances, the moving party is seeking a new proceeding on the premise that the factual underpinnings of the district court’s decision were incorrect. This analogy applies to an order resolving a motion to correct an illegal sentence. State v. Dist. Ct. (Brown), 141 Nev. Adv. Op. No. 27, ___ P.3d ___ (June 5, 2025).
Competency: (1) To competently answer criminal allegations, defendants must have the present ability to understand the nature and purpose of judicial proceedings, and they must be able to reasonably assist in their own defense, and (2) here, the dismissal of a criminal charge against respondent Matthew Desavio was an appropriate remedy for the violation of his due-process rights caused by a delay in competency-restoration treatment while he was incarcerated pending trial. The district court dismissed the case based on the failure of the Nevada Division of Public and Behavioral Health (the Division) to comply with both the original commitment order—pursuant to NRS 178.425(1)’s mandate “to convey the defendant forthwith” for competency-restoration treatment—and the subsequent contempt order that included the directive to transfer Desavio for competency-restoration treatment within seven days. Any “difficulties involving the availability of beds, staffing shortages, or other logistical challenges cannot justify detaining an individual in jail for month after month without recourse.” For incompetent defendants in need of recourse, but for whom dismissal with prejudice is too severe, dismissal without prejudice may be an appropriate remedy where the district court first tried lesser remedies without any success. State v. Desavio (Matthew), 141 Nev. Adv. Op. No. 25, ___ P.3d ___ (May 22, 2025).
Dependency: (1) NRS 432B.530 provides a party with an opportunity to admit or deny the allegations contained in a petition; (2) such an opportunity does not confine the party to strictly admitting or denying the allegations; a district court may properly accept a no-contest plea regardless of whether the district attorney offered a no-contest plea as part of negotiations; and (3) when a party does not contest the allegations, that will operate the same way as if they had admitted to the allegations for purposes of Chapter 432B proceedings. When a child-protection agency files a petition alleging that a child is in need of protection, NRS 432B.530(2) requires the district court to “inform the parties of the specific allegations in the petition and give them an opportunity to admit or deny them.” Here, the Supreme Court of Nevada clarified that, consistent with NRS 432B.530(2), a district court may accept a plea of no contest and move forward with the matter as though the allegations of the petition are true with or without agreement from the district attorney. This reading of NRS 432B.530(2) is consistent with NRS Chapter 432B’s goal of providing children with the best chance of swift resolution to reduce harm and promote timely reunification, proper placement, or provision of services. The Court emphasized that, “[t]o be clear, nothing in this opinion should be read to authorize a district court to negotiate plea conditions on behalf of the district attorney”; “[a] no-contest plea simply allows the district court to move forward on the contents of the petition as though the allegations are true, avoiding unnecessary delay in situations where a parent does not wish to admit to criminal wrongdoing.” In re: A.T., a Minor (Family), 141 Nev. Adv. Op. No. 32, ___ P.3d ___ (June 12, 2025).
Immunity: (1) Qualified and discretionary-act immunities protect government employees from suit when performing their jobs unless they do so in a way that violates a clearly established right or is conducted in bad faith; (2) these immunities present legal issues that must be decided before trial; and (3) here, the defendant’s actions did not violate any of the plaintiff’s clearly established rights but rather reflected her lawful exercise of discretion as a public servant. This opinion addresses whether qualified and discretionary-act immunity apply to bar suit against a social worker who allegedly coerced a parent to sign guardianship papers permitting relatives to temporarily care for his children. The Supreme Court of Nevada concluded that immunity bars the suit. The Court noted that “[o]ther courts have held that it is not unconstitutionally coercive for a social worker to offer parents a choice between a supervisory plan short of full removal and full removal, so long as statutory authority supports removal.” Moreover, the defendant’s actions in investigating the plaintiff and in obtaining his consent to a temporary guardianship clearly implicate Nevada’s policy of supporting the best interests of children, and allowing the claims against the defendant to proceed could negatively impact how that policy is carried out in the future. Clark Cnty. v. Dist. Ct. (Eggleston), 141 Nev. Adv. Op. No. 31, ___ P.3d ___ (June 12, 2025).
Judicial Confirmation Law: The Judicial Confirmation Law (JCL) permits municipalities to petition the district court for an early judicial determination of the validity of a municipal act, but because the Las Vegas Metropolitan Police Department (LVMPD) failed to show it is a municipality, the district court properly concluded that LVMPD could not file a petition under that law to obtain a determination as to its disclosure obligations under the Nevada Public Records Act (NPRA). LVMPD made a novel argument in contending that a metropolitan police department is a “municipality” with a “governing body” that may file a JCL petition under NRS Chapter 43. However, a municipality for purposes of the JCL is a state entity, with a group forming a governing body, that is (1) among those entities listed in NRS 43.080, (2) any other corporate district constituting a political subdivision, or (3) any corporate and politic entity. On balance, LVMPD fell short of showing it is a municipality under the JCL. Rather, LVMPD is a local governmental department. Nor has LVMPD shown that it has a “governing body” that may institute a JCL petition. If the legislature wished to expand the JCL to encompass entities that do not fall within its original definitions, it could have amended the JCL accordingly, but it has not. Separately, the Supreme Court of Nevada found that the NPRA does not allow a governmental entity to bypass NRS 239.0107 and seek declaratory relief in response to a public-records request. In re: Pub. Records Request to Las Vegas Metro. Police Dep’t, 141 Nev. Adv. Op. No. 26, ___ P.3d ___ (May 29, 2025).
Medical malpractice: A patient’s suicide does not, as a matter of law, prevent a medical provider from being liable for medical malpractice. The instant action alleged that a medical provider’s negligence in treating his patient caused the patient to die by suicide. The Court declined to adopt a rule that a patient’s suicide relieves a medical provider of liability for the patient’s death. Instead, “the determination as to whether a medical provider is liable for a patient’s injuries must be resolved under established medical malpractice law.” Bourne v. Valdes, M.D., 141 Nev. Adv. Op. No. 30, ___ P.3d ___ (June 12, 2025) (replacing Bourne v. Valdes, 140 Nev. ––––, 559 P.3d 361 (2024)).
Personal jurisdiction: The effects test for personal jurisdiction from Calder v. Jones, 465 U.S. 783, 790 (1984), only applies to intentional-tort claims. In the Calder effects test, specific personal jurisdiction is appropriate if “the defendant (1) committed an intentional act, (2) expressly aimed at the forum state, (3) causing harm that the defendant knows is likely to be suffered in the forum state.” A “plaintiff’s contacts with the defendant and the forum are not the proper focus of jurisdictional analysis; instead, the effects inquiry and the question of minimum contacts focuses on . . . ‘the defendant’s suit-related conduct,’ which ‘must create a substantial connection with the forum.” The Calder test turns on whether the alleged tortious conduct of the defendant was intentional, and intentional torts require a deliberate act intended to cause harm. Here, the claims against the defendant sound entirely in negligence, so the Calder test does not apply. Whitley v. Greyhound Lines, Inc., 141 Nev. Adv. Op. No. 33, ___ P.3d ___ (June 18, 2025).
Punitive damages: An unjust-enrichment claim can support punitive damages. A plaintiff may recover punitive damages for the “breach of an obligation not arising from contract” when clear and convincing evidence of “oppression, fraud or malice, express or implied,” exists. The jury’s award must be overturned if “the amount of damages awarded is clearly disproportionate to the degree of blameworthiness and harmfulness inherent in the oppressive, fraudulent or malicious misconduct of the tortfeasor under the circumstances of a given case.” No intrinsic inconsistency exists in a judgment that reinforces disgorgement of wrongful gain with an explicitly punitive award. Nevada statutes generally limit punitive damages to “[t]hree times the amount of compensatory damages awarded to the plaintiff if the amount of compensatory damages is $100,000 or more.” In addition to this cap, a court must consider due process in awarding punitive damages. The “ratio between compensatory and punitive damages” is a central feature of the due-process analysis. The Supreme Court of the United States has indicated a punitive-damages award with a ratio that can be categorized as “grossly excessive” when compared to compensatory damages violates the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. When compensatory damages are “already substantial, a ratio of 1:1 may be the most the Constitution will permit.” The proper standards for reviewing excessiveness include the degree of reprehensibility of the defendant’s conduct, the ratio of punitive damages to compensatory damages, and the sanctions for comparable misconduct. United Healthcare Ins. Co. v. Fremont Emergency Servs. (Mandavia), Ltc. C/W 85656, 141 Nev. Adv. Op. No. 29, ___ P.3d ___ (June 12, 2025).
Nevada Court of Appeals
Child custody: (1) When a party to a stipulated custody agreement petitions to relocate with a minor child, the district court is generally not required to evaluate the “true nature” of the parties’ custodial arrangement in order to determine whether NRS 125C.006 or NRS 125C.0065 applies; (2) instead, the applicability of NRS 125C.006 or NRS 125C.0065 depends on whether joint or primary physical custody “has been established pursuant to an order, judgment or decree of a court” and (3) when the nonrelocating parent files a countermotion for primary physical custody that is entirely contingent upon the pending relocation petition, a district court may not decide the countermotion first, as this impermissibly shifts the burden of proof in violation of NRS 125C.007(3). In this opinion, the Court of Appeals considered whether Rivero v. Rivero, 125 Nev. 410, 216 P.3d 213 (2009), overruled in part by Romano v. Romano, 138 Nev. 1, 501 P.3d 980 (2022), requires a district court to ascertain the “true nature” of the parties’ custodial arrangement in determining whether a party to a custody agreement who seeks to relocate with a child must petition the court for primary physical custody pursuant to NRS 125C.0065. Dicta in Rivero suggests that district courts should first evaluate the parties’ de facto custodial arrangement before deciding a relocation petition. However, Nevada’s current relocation statutes were enacted after Rivero was decided. Pursuant to the plain language of these statutes, a parent’s obligation to petition for primary physical custody now depends on whether joint or primary custody “has been established pursuant to an order, judgment or decree of a court,” not on the “true nature” of the parties’ custodial arrangement. Thus, where a stipulated custody order clearly indicates the parties’ custodial arrangement, the order controls and the court generally need not evaluate the de facto custodial arrangement to determine whether NRS 125C.006 or NRS 125C.0065 applies. Moreover, regardless of whether any countermotion for primary physical custody is filed, the relocating parent always bears the burden of proof to establish that relocation is in the child’s best interest. To avoid shifting this burden of proof to the nonrelocating parent, a district court must decide a pending relocation petition before ruling on any contingent countermotion for primary physical custody filed by the nonrelocating parent.Finally, the Court clarified that the preponderance-of-the-evidence standard applies to the relocating parent’s ultimate burden under NRS 125C.007(3) to establish that relocation is in the best interest of the child. Johnson v. Bennett (Child Custody), 141 Nev. Adv. Op. No. 35, ___ P.3d ___ (June 26, 2025).
Workers’ compensation:(1) In 2015, the Nevada Legislature amended NRS 617.457 to limit the workers’-compensation benefits that retired firefighters, arson investigators, and police officers may obtain in connection with claims for diseases of the heart that are filed after their retirement; (2) generally, NRS 617.457(14) provides that retirees who file such claims may only recover medical benefits; but (3) the limitation set forth in NRS 617.457(14) does not apply to retirees who have completed at least 20 years of creditable service as of June 8, 2015. Because the respondent here had at least 20 years of creditable service as a firefighter as of June 8, 2015, she was not barred from recovering permanent-total-disability benefits for the heart disease claim that she filed in 2021, after her retirement. In addition, respondent’s permanent-total-disability benefits were properly calculated based on wages she earned on her last day of covered employment. City of Las Vegas v. Munson (Civil), 141 Nev. Adv. Op. No. 28, ___ P.3d ___ (June 12, 2025).
Resources
- “Advance Opinions” are viewable at this link: http://nvcourts.gov/Supreme/Decisions/Advance_Opinions/
- A list of “Forthcoming Opinions” is available at this link every Wednesday: http://nvcourts.gov/Supreme/Decisions/Forthcoming_Opinions/
- “Supreme Court Unpublished Orders” are viewable at this link: http://nvcourts.gov/Supreme/Decisions/Unpublished_Orders/
- “Court of Appeals Unpublished Orders” are viewable at this link: http://nvcourts.gov/Supreme/Decisions/Court_of_Appeals/Unpublished_Orders/
About the author
Joe Tommasino has served as Staff Attorney for the Las Vegas Justice Court since 1996. Joe is the President of the Nevada Association for Court Career Advancement (NACCA).
About the article
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This article was originally submitted for publication in the Communiqué (June/July 2025), the official publication of the Clark County Bar Association.
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