By Jennifer K. Hostetler
An employee does not have to meet a “significant” or heightened-injury standard to establish a claim under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (“Title VII”) for a discriminatory job transfer, just “some harm” respecting the employee’s terms and conditions of employment, the Supreme Court of the United States held in Muldrow v. City of St. Louis, Missouri, 601 U.S. __ (2024).
Background on Muldrow
Sgt. Jatonya Clayborn Muldrow was a female police officer who was transferred to another unit following nine years of service in the St. Louis Police Department’s specialized intelligence division. In her former unit, Muldrow investigated public corruption and human trafficking cases, oversaw the gang unit, served as head of the gun crimes unit, and was deputized as a task force officer with the FBI. Her role granted her FBI credentials, an unmarked take-home vehicle, and authority to pursue investigations outside of St. Louis.
Despite her objections, Muldrow was transferred out of the unit because she is a woman. A new intelligence division commander requested the transfer because a male police officer seemed a better fit for the division’s “very dangerous” work. Muldrow’s responsibilities shifted from working with high-ranking officials on intelligence cases to supervising day-to-day activities of neighborhood police officers, going on patrol, and handling administrative matters, such as reading arrest reports. Although Muldrow did not experience a reduction in pay or rank, she alleged that the transfer moved her to a less prestigious and more administrative role, resulting in loss of perks, networking opportunities with commanding officers, and the ability to work on high-profile investigations. Some of the benefits Muldrow lost were her FBI credentials, take-home vehicle, ability to wear plain clothes, and a regular Monday-to-Friday, nine-to-five schedule.
Muldrow sued the City of St. Louis (“City”) alleging sex discrimination under Title VII for her transfer. The district court granted the City summary judgment, and the Eighth Circuit affirmed, holding that Muldrow could not show that the transfer caused her a “materially significant disadvantage,” and emphasized that the transfer did not result in a diminution to her title, salary, or benefits. However, the standard applied for whether a transfer resulted in harm to the employee varied among the circuits.
The Supreme Court of the United States granted certiorari to resolve a circuit split over whether an employee challenging a transfer under Title VII must meet a heightened threshold of harm.
The Supreme Court’s ruling
Writing for the Supreme Court of the United States, Justice Elena Kagan vacated the judgment of the Eighth Circuit and remanded, writing that courts must “use the proper Title VII standard, and not demand that Muldrow demonstrate her transfer caused ‘significant’ harm,’” as Title VII requires an employee to show that the transfer results in some “disadvantageous” change to employment. The Court held that an “employee challenging a job transfer under Title VII must show that the transfer brought about some harm with respect to an identifiable term or condition of employment, but that harm need not be significant” or exceed some heightened bar. In citing several cases where lower courts rejected employee claims where there was no “significant” change in employment conditions, Justice Kagan wrote that these “claims were rejected solely because courts rewrote Title VII, compelling workers to make a showing that the statutory text does not require.”
As to Muldrow, the Court noted the transfer must have left her worse off (but not significantly worse off), and if she could prove her allegations, Muldrow had satisfied the appropriate harm standard “with room to spare” as “she was left worse off several times over.”
What the ruling means
The ruling clarified that an employee is not required to meet a heightened standard of harm to establish a claim under Title VII for a discriminatory job transfer—just some injury or harm. The ruling, however, left open the question of what is sufficient to demonstrate “some harm.” It is too early to tell how the district courts will apply this new lower standard. However, it is expected that courts will look beyond title, salary, and benefits to all aspects of a job transfer including associated perks, schedule, and career prospects, to determine whether an employee is worse off than before the transfer.
Additionally, while the Supreme Court’s holding is narrowly tailored to job transfers, it remains to be seen whether courts will now apply this lower standard to Title VII discrimination claims outside the transfer context.
About the author
Jennifer K. Hostetler is a partner at Lewis Roca. Jennifer defends employers in state and federal court against claims brought by their employees including claims of wrongful termination and discrimination. Jennifer also counsels and advises employers with respect to their employment decisions and policies.
About the article
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This article was originally published in the Communiqué (Sep. 2024), the official publication of the Clark County Bar Association. See https://clarkcountybar.org/about/member-benefits/communique-2024/communique-sep-2024/.
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