Written by Joe Tommasino, Esq.
Supreme Court of Nevada
Courtroom closure: The district court must consider specific factors when deciding whether a family-law proceeding may be closed. Petitioner argued that the district court erred in concluding that family-law proceedings cannot be closed to the public pursuant to Falconi v. Eighth Judicial District Court, 140 Nev. Adv. Op. 8, 543 P.3d 92 (2024), cert. denied sub nom. Minter v. Falconi. No. 24-338, 2024 WL 4655008 (Nov. 4, 2024). The Supreme Court of Nevada agreed. The Falconi case recognized that while the public has a presumptive right to access legal proceedings, including family-law matters, a hearing may be closed when a party demonstrates that privacy interests outweigh the public’s right to access. To overcome the presumption of an open proceeding, a party must demonstrate that (1) closure serves a compelling interest; (2) there is a substantial probability that, in the absence of closure, this compelling interest could be harmed; and (3) there are no alternatives to closure that would adequately protect the compelling interest. These factors must be considered on a case-by-case basis. In some cases, courts have determined that there is a compelling interest in protecting children from undue embarrassment or psychological or physical harm, which may support closing proceedings. Possible alternatives to immediate closure of an entire proceeding or hearing might be holding it in camera or “closing only those parts of the hearing that jeopardize the interests advanced.” When a request for closure is granted, courts “must sua sponte consider possible alternatives to [the] closure even when they are not offered by the parties,” but any alternative must be both practical and feasible. Nester v. Dist. Ct. (Gamble), 141 Nev. Adv. Op. No. 4, ___ P.3d ___ (January 30, 2025).
Criminal law: (1) NRS 239.330(1) makes it a felony to knowingly offer for filing, registration, or recording any false or forged instrument that, if genuine, might be filed, registered, or recorded under the laws of the State of Nevada or the United States; and (2) to support a conviction, the State must prove that there is a law allowing for the filing, registration, or recordation of the specific type of document at issue through the office to which it is offered. Ambiguity in a statute defining a crime should be resolved in the defendant’s favor. Thus, the Supreme Court of Nevada concluded that NRS 239.330(1) concerns documents having the present ability to be filed under state or federal law, but that are forged or contain false information. This construction of the statute accounts for its likely purpose: to prevent officials from acting upon documents in mistaken belief of accuracy. Vaughn (Kenneth) v. State, 141 Nev. Adv. Op. No. 6, ___ P.3d ___ (February 6, 2025).
Insurance companies: NRS 696B.420(1)(b) excludes a private insurance company’s subrogation claim. When an insurance company becomes insolvent, that company’s remaining assets may not cover all outstanding claims against it. To fairly apportion the insolvent company’s assets, NRS 696B.420 prioritizes certain claims and claimants over others. The highest nonadministrative priority classification, NRS 696B.420(1)(b), includes claims by and against policyholders of the insolvent insurance company and claims by specific statutory insurance guaranty associations. The question presented was whether this high-priority classification includes a private insurance company’s subrogation claim. Appellant Protective Insurance Company paid uninsured/underinsured motorist (UM/UIM) benefits to its insured after the tortfeasor’s liability insurer became insolvent. Protective insisted that its claim—a subrogation claim arising out of its payment of UM/UIM benefits—fell within the high-priority classification of NRS 696B.420(1)(b). Respondent, the Nevada Insurance Commissioner, who was acting as the failed insurance company’s receiver, urged the Supreme Court of Nevada to conclude that NRS 696B.420(1)(b) excludes Protective’s claim, placing the claim within the lower-priority residual category, NRS 696B.420(1)(g). On appeal, the Court held that “Nevada subrogation law, the statute’s text, and public policy all require that NRS 696B.420(1)(b) exclude such claims.” The Court therefore affirmed the district court’s determination that the Insurance Commissioner properly relegated Protective’s claim to NRS 696B.420(1)(g), the residual category. Protective Ins. Co. v. State, Comm’r of Ins., 141 Nev. Adv. Op. No. 3, ___ P.3d ___ (January 16, 2025).
Name changes: (1) The district court denied, with prejudice, petitions for adult name change because appellants failed to submit proof of publication in a newspaper of general circulation; and (2) the denials should have been without prejudice. NRS 41.270-.290 permits successive name-change petitions. The words “with prejudice” are without legal meaning here and in no way prohibit appellants from refiling name-change petitions. Nevertheless, in order that the words “with prejudice” may not be construed as res judicata in any future name-change petitions filed by appellants, those words must be stricken from the court’s orders. In re: Petition for Change of Name (Fleek) C/W 88016/88190, 141 Nev. Adv. Op. No. 7, ___ P.3d ___ (February 6, 2025).
Peace officers: NRS 289.060(2)(d) requires a peace officer to lead an investigation or conduct interrogations and hearings in a proceeding where another peace officer may be subject to punitive action. The Nevada Peace Officer’s Bill of Rights (POBR) (NRS 289.010-.120) provides protections for peace officers. The dispute here arose when a peace officer was subject to punitive action, and the disciplinary investigation was conducted by a City of Las Vegas human-resources employee instead of a peace officer. A peace officer being investigated has a right to written notice of an investigation, and “[t]he notice provided to the peace officer who is the subject of the investigation must include . . . [t]he name and rank of the officer in charge of the investigation and the officers who will conduct any interrogation or hearing.” NRS 289.060(2) requires that an officer with a rank lead an investigation because it requires notice who that individual will be. The statute, however, does not define “officer” and is ambiguous. However, the Legislature intended to treat “peace officer” and “officer” as synonymous. Given that the statute provides that a law enforcement agency may investigate colorable allegations against one of its peace officers, it follows naturally that “rank” and “the officer in charge” in NRS 289.060(2)(d) refer to rank within the agency and, thus, a peace officer within it. Moreover, the investigation pursuant to these provisions is an “internal” one, and it is reasonable to conclude that an internal investigation of a peace officer would be conducted by another peace officer inside, and thus internal to, the agency. Public policy supports this reading in that it ensures that the investigation is conducted by one familiar with standards and experiences particular to peace officers. Therefore, NRS 289.060(2)(d) envisions that a ranked peace officer must conduct any investigation that could result in punishment against another peace officer. However, “[n]othing in NRS Chapter 289 prevents a peace officer investigating another peace officer from seeking assistance from human resources employees, legal counsel, or others who have specialized knowledge and experience in such matters.” NRS 289.060 simply requires that the investigating peace officer remain in charge of the investigation. City of Las Vegas v. Las Vegas Police Prot. Ass’n., 141 Nev. Adv. Op. No. 1, ___ P.3d ___ (January 9, 2025).
Retirement benefits: (1) Members of the Public Employees’ Retirement System of Nevada (PERS) and the Judicial Retirement System of Nevada (JRS) may, upon retirement, designate a beneficiary to be paid the member’s retirement benefits for the life of the beneficiary following the member’s death, and the option for payment to a beneficiary after the death of the member is known as Option 2; (2) a JRS member can designate both a former spouse and a current spouse as Option 2 beneficiaries when the former spouse is entitled to only a percentage of the benefit as part of a divorce decree—meaning if the member predeceases both the former and current spouses, both must be paid as Option 2 beneficiaries in accordance with their respective portion of the benefits; and (3) when a former spouse of a PERS member possesses a protected interest in the member’s PERS retirement benefits, that interest is not extinguished if the member transfers the benefits from PERS to JRS. Here, a PERS member left public employment to enter private practice as an attorney and subsequently agreed as part of a divorce decree to designate his ex-wife as the Option 2 beneficiary of his PERS account. Thereafter, the member remarried, reentered public employment as a judge, transferred his PERS service credits to JRS, and wished to designate his current wife the Option 2 beneficiary of his JRS account. The question was whether, under NRS 1A.450(1)(a), a JRS member may designate more than one Option 2 beneficiary. NRS 1A.450(1)(a)’s use of the singular term “beneficiary” suggests that only a single beneficiary can be designated. And PERS urged that interpretation, asserting that it has never allowed a member to designate more than one Option 2 beneficiary. However, nothing in the statute explicitly prohibits a member from designating more than one Option 2 beneficiary. Given the circumstances here—where a member, after leaving public employment, has agreed to designate a former spouse as an Option 2 beneficiary as part of a divorce but then remarries, re-enters public employment, and wishes to designate his current spouse as an Option 2 beneficiary—the Court could not conclude that NRS 1A.450(1)(a) limits Option 2 to a single beneficiary. Interpreting NRS 1A.450(1)(a) as allowing more than one beneficiary harmonizes other relevant statutes and comports with community-property principles. The Court also held that when a divorce decree provides a former spouse an interest in a PERS member’s retirement account, the member’s transfer to JRS does not extinguish that interest. Walker v. Walker, 141 Nev. Adv. Op. No. 2, ___ P.3d ___ (January 9, 2025).
Nevada Court of Appeals
Occupational disease: (1) NRS 617.457 requires that the predisposing conditions referenced in subsection (11) are the same predisposing conditions that lead to the heart disease that causes the claimant’s disablement as described in subsection (1); and (2) to assert the affirmative defense in NRS 617.457(11), a party opposing a firefighter, police officer, or arson investigator’s workers’-compensation claim under NRS 617.457 must correlate the corrective action to the predisposing conditions that actually cause the firefighter, police officer, or arson investigator’s disabling heart disease. To receive benefits for an occupational disease, an employee must typically establish by a preponderance of the evidence that the employee’s occupational disease arose out of and in the course of his employment. However, NRS 617.457(1) creates a conclusive presumption for firefighters, police officers, and arson investigators under certain circumstances. A firefighter, police officer, or arson investigator employed for two years who has a heart condition that leads to disablement is entitled to a conclusive presumption that the heart disease arose out of the person’s employment. NRS 617.457(1). However, NRS 617.457(11) provides a party defending against such a claim with an affirmative defense: if a doctor orders the employee to correct predisposing conditions that lead to heart disease. and those predisposing conditions are within the ability of the employee to control, the employee can only benefit from the conclusive presumption if the employee does indeed correct them. Here, the Court of Appeals concluded that “under a plain reading of NRS 617.457(1) and (11), the relevant predisposing conditions for purposes of subsection (11)’s affirmative defense are the conditions that cause the disabling heart disease as described in subsection (1).” Therefore, the appeals officer correctly applied the law, and her decision ordering benefits was supported by substantial evidence. CCMSI v. Odell, 141 Nev. Adv. Op. No. 5, ___ P.3d ___ (January 30, 2025).
Resources
- “Advance Opinions” are viewable at this link: http://nvcourts.gov/Supreme/Decisions/Advance_Opinions/
- A list of “Forthcoming Opinions” is available at this link every Wednesday: http://nvcourts.gov/Supreme/Decisions/Forthcoming_Opinions/
- “Supreme Court Unpublished Orders” are viewable at this link: http://nvcourts.gov/Supreme/Decisions/Unpublished_Orders/
- “Court of Appeals Unpublished Orders” are viewable at this link: http://nvcourts.gov/Supreme/Decisions/Court_of_Appeals/Unpublished_Orders/
About the author
Joe Tommasino has served as Staff Attorney for the Las Vegas Justice Court since 1996. Joe is the President of the Nevada Association for Court Career Advancement (NACCA).
About the article
© 2025 Clark County Bar Association (CCBA). All rights reserved. No reproduction of any portion of this issue is allowed without written permission from the publisher. Editorial policy available upon request.
This article was originally submitted for publication in the Communiqué (Mar. 2025), the official publication of the Clark County Bar Association.
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